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 CURRENTOPINION Breathlessness and the brain: the role
of expectation
Lucy L. Marlowa, Olivia K. Faullb, Sarah L. Finnegana,
and Kyle T.S. Pattinsona
Purpose of review
Breathlessness debilitates countless people with a wide range of common diseases. For some people, the
experience of breathlessness is poorly explained by the findings of medical tests. This disparity complicates
diagnostic and treatment options and means that disease-modifying treatments do not always have the
expected effect upon symptoms. These observations suggest that brain processing of respiratory perceptions
may be somewhat independent of disease processes. This may help to explain the dissonance observed in
some patients between physical disease markers and the lived experience of breathlessness.
Recent findings
A body of breathlessness research using functional neuroimaging has identified a relatively consistent set of
brain areas that are associated with breathlessness. These areas include the insula, cingulate and sensory
cortices, the amygdala and the periaqueductal gray matter. We interpret these findings in the context of
new theories of perception that emphasize the importance of distributed brain networks. Within this
framework, these perceptual networks function by checking an internal model (a set of expectations)
against peripheral sensory inputs, instead of the brain acting as a passive signal transducer. Furthermore,
other factors beyond the physiology of breathlessness can influence the system.
Summary
A person’s expectations and mood are major contributors to the function of the brain networks that
generate perceptions of breathlessness. Breathlessness, therefore, arises from inferences made by the
brain’s integration of both expectations and sensory inputs. By better understanding individual differences
across these contributing perceptual factors, we will be better poised to develop targeted and
individualized treatments for breathlessness that could complement disease-modifying therapies.
Keywords
brain, breathlessness, dyspnoea, expectation, interoception
INTRODUCTION
Physicians often point out a puzzling phenome-
non that one can see two patients with the same
lung function (measured objectively) whereby
one patient is active, goes out every day, and does
many things healthy people do such as work and
raise children, whereas the other patient, with the
same measured lung function, is severely dis-
abled, housebound, and does very little indepen-
dently. Havi Carel (2018) [1
&&
]
It is well recognized that the subjective experi-
ence of breathlessness is often poorly explained by
objective disease markers, such as tests of lung [2]
and heart function [3]. This discordance extends
into the way different people respond to
treatment, and can even manifest as unexpected
breathlessness, particularly in response to
stressful situations. This is illustrated by the follow-
ing examples:
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REVIEW
(1) Pulmonary rehabilitation, a course of exercise
and education for people with breathing diffi-
culties, profoundly improves breathlessness yet
has no measurable effect on lung function [4–
6]. The beneficial effect on breathlessness-
related fear and anxiety is noteworthy [7,8].
(2) The monoclonal antibody Mepolizumab has
revolutionized the treatment of eosinophilic
asthma. However, around 40% of people who
are successfully treated (defined by resolution of
inflammatory markers) remain symptomatic
[9].
(3) Anecdotally, individuals with asthma often
report feeling breathless immediately on notic-
ing the loss of their inhaler.
(4) Equally, individuals with lung disease who use
ambulatory oxygen report similar sensations
and concerns when operating without their
cylinder or without a spare cylinder on hand;
despite oxygen saturations remaining constant,
they can experience significant breathlessness.
Symptoms appear ’out of the blue’ in response
to the psychological stressor of having the oxy-
gen cylinder, or its spare, out of reach.
An extensive body of literature has provided
understanding of the scope of pathophysiological
mechanisms that can lead to breathlessness. The
importance of lung mechanics, gas exchange, skele-
tal muscle, diaphragmatic and cardiac function
[10,11
&
,12] are well documented. However, it is
increasingly clear that peripheral pathophysiology
only tells us part of the story, and that brain mech-
anisms associated with affective state and expecta-
tions play an important role. For example, in pain,
manipulating expectations can influence subjective
perception reports by approximately 30% [13,14
&&
].
Therefore, we need to consider the brain as an active
participant in the generation of perceptions, so that
we can begin to understand the fundamental neural
mechanisms by which breathlessness arises.
To date, functional neuroimaging studies have
identified a relatively consistent set of brain regions
that are active during breathlessness [15–18].
Although this enables more focused hypothesis gen-
eration, it must be noted that most studies have not
dissociated brain activity that is specific to the sensa-
tion of breathlessness (e.g. that scales with self-
report) from other concurrent processes that might
happen at the same time (e.g. increased work of
breathing [19]). As such, it appears that searching
for a linear scaling of breathlessness (within and
between individuals) with localized activity in a
specific ‘breathlessness brain region’ is somewhat
unlikely to yield fruitful results. This is primarily
because the fundamental actions of the brain are
thought to result from distributed network activity,
rather than different brain areas having specific func-
tions (e.g. phrenology). Additionally, we know that
breathlessness can vary across moments in time,
specific episodes and individuals [20]. Thus, instead
of focusing on specific breathlessness brain regions,
weneed to broadenour perspective to investigate the
dynamic and distributed brain networks that gener-
ate breathlessness, allowing for multiple influencing
factors and individual differences. This will help
guide understanding beyond where in the brain
breathlessness is processed, to how it is processed.
This review explains current evidence on how
neural signals from the body are integrated by the
brain, leading to perceptions such as breathlessness.
We explain how aberrant perceptual processingmay
help us better understand the disconnect between a
person’s experience of breathlessness and objective
disease markers measured by physicians [1
&&
,21
&&
].
We will then explain how this approach will help
develop new treatments for breathlessness.
THE PREDICTIVE BRAIN AND
INTEROCEPTION
The brain, encased within the skull, has no direct
access to any stimulus, either internal or external to
the body. Each person’s ‘reality’ is based upon a
limited set of (noisy) incoming sensory signals.
To decipher these signals, the brain refers to past
experiences and beliefs to predict what is happen-
ing [22–24]. An example from the visual system is
KEY POINTS
 The subjective experience of breathlessness does not
always match objective measures of disease,
suggesting that differences in sensory processing in the
brain may play a role.
 It is well established that expectation (and anticipation)
and affect (mood) influence breathlessness.
 New neuroscientific theories suggest the brain holds an
‘internal model’ of the world and is an active
participant in the generation of breathlessness.
 Breathlessness results from a dynamic integration of the
brain’s internal model with incoming sensory
information, and this integration is strongly influenced
by expectations and affective state.
 Anything that affects the brain’s internal model can
contribute to a mismatch between peripheral
physiology and the perception of breathlessness, and
understanding these contributions will lead to new
therapeutic targets for breathlessness.
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illustrated in Fig. 1, where your brain must make
inferences about the missing pixels in the sensory
signal. These ideas have more recently been
extended beyond the visual system to internal sen-
sations, including breathing [25].
Interoception is a neuroscientific term that
encompasses the brain’s sensing of stimuli from
within the body, both conscious and subconscious
[25]. Whilst traditional models of perception con-
sidered the brain as a passive stimulus–response
FIGURE 1. Integration of prediction and sensory input. In order to generate a perception (whether it be visual as in this
example or respiratory awareness in the case of breathlessness) the brain has to interpret a noisy set of sensory inputs. To do
this we now think that the brain depends upon a set of predictions built out of past experiences and beliefs. The final
perception, be it visual or breathing, is thus an inference. Anything that changes the inference may change the perception
irrespective of sensory input. When predictions are accurate, what we ultimately see, or feel, is closely related to what is
actually present in the environment or our bodies. However, when predictions are inaccurate, our perceptions can be different
to the real world (represented here by the distorted bowl of fruit). When predictions about breathing based on past
experiences of breathlessness are negative (e.g. sense of failure for not achieving an activity, feeling of social pressure to walk
at equal speed to a companion, fear of needing to sit down and not being near a chair), the final perception of
breathlessness may be severe, despite the physiological changes not being so significant (a distorted perception).
Respiratory problems
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organ, current theories promote the brain to play an
active role in perception. From this perspective, the
brain holds an existing mental model of the world
(both external and internal to the body), which is
constantly altered and updated via its interaction
with incoming sensory inputs [26]. This approach
enables predictions about the world’s current state
to be fed forward through a neural network, allow-
ing model updates via the mismatch between pre-
dictions and sensory signals. Prediction error is the
neuroscientific term used to describe this mismatch
(or error) between what the brain expects (predic-
tions) and what the brain receives (sensory signals).
The ideas of predictions and prediction errors have
been successfully adopted in simple models that
explain learning behaviours, such as those by
Rescorla and Wagner [27]. More intricately, Bayes-
ian theories hypothesize that the brain utilizes inter-
nal probabilistic models to manage uncertainty
amongst the sensory noise [22]. In this framework,
the brain deals with uncertainty by generating a
probable set of predictions that are informed by
past experiences (e.g. struggling to breathe), which
are combined with contextual cues from the
environment (e.g. fresh flowers that signal pollen
and asthma attacks) to regularize the noisy sensory
signals.
Current theories of interoception, including the
Embodied Prediction Interoceptive Coding model
(EPIC) [28] and the Neurovisceral IntegrationModel
[29], have made suggestions regarding where pre-
dictions and prediction errors are generated [28],
although evidence is currently scarce. These models
hypothesize that predictions are generated in agra-
nular, limbic cortices (such as the anterior cingulate
cortex and anterior insula cortex), before being fed
forward through a hierarchical network and com-
pared with incoming sensory signals, leading to the
generation of prediction errors at multiple levels
(Fig. 2). The dynamic comparison and integration
of these two signals leads to interoceptive percep-
tions, such as breathlessness. Furthermore, to reduce
errors, prediction error magnitudes are thought
to either drive learning via updating of predictions,
or the generation of actions that alter incoming
sensations to better match predictions [23]. There-
fore, anything influencing the generation of pre-
dictions or their dynamic comparison with sensory
afferents may alter breathlessness perception in
combination with the peripheral environment.
INFLUENCES ON BREATHLESSNESS
PERCEPTION
Although the influence of expectations and affect
(or more broadly, our emotions) on perceptions
such as breathlessness have long been recognized
[30–34], the mechanisms of action are currently
unknown. Here, we explain our current understand-
ing of the brain’s involvement in breathlessness,
and how factors such as expectation and affect
can influence this perceptual system.
Learned expectations
Expectations are known to have a significant influ-
ence on breathlessness. For example, in people with
asthma, breathlessness-related cues (such as wheez-
ing sounds) can induce breathlessness [31,32] and
even measurable levels of bronchoconstriction [33].
Equally, simply observing breathlessness in others
can induce mild-to-moderate breathlessness [35
&
].
Furthermore, perceptions of breathlessness are
increased when an individual returns to a context
or situation in which breathlessness has been previ-
ously experienced, even in the absence of the origi-
nal breathlessness stimulus [34,36]. As such, an
individual with chronic breathlessness approaching
a flight of stairs may feel breathless before even
beginning to climb the stairs. The brain’s predic-
tions based on past experiences of stairs leading to
breathlessness, and the expectations regarding sim-
ilar situations thus motivate the perception.
Studies using functional neuroimaging have
begun to highlight the brain areas associated with
simple expectations of breathlessness. Conditioned
anticipationofbreathlessness [15–18,37] andbreath-
lessness-related word cues [38–40] are associated
with activations in a broad network including the
anterior insula, anterior cingulate, prefrontal cortex,
plus midbrain structures including the ventrolateral
periaqueductal gray (PAG) [41
&&
,42,43]. Faull et al.
[37] have uncovered initial evidence of dynamic
actions within this network, whereby anticipatory
brain activitymay influence resulting perceptions. In
this study, the strengthof thedisconnectbetween the
ventrolateral PAG and both lateral PAG and motor
cortices during anticipation reflected subsequent
breathlessness perception. This work evidences the
importance of expectations in breathlessness percep-
tion and has highlighted some of the brain areas
involved. However, further investigations are
required to elucidate the underlying brain mecha-
nisms that link expectation and breathlessness.
Affect
Affect has a demonstrable impact on breathlessness
[44]. Depression and anxiety are major comorbid-
ities in respiratory disease, cardiac disease and can-
cer [45–49]. Depression and anxiety are associated
with increased breathlessness [50,51], increased
Breathlessness and the brain Marlow et al.
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FIGURE 2. Potential neural network for breathlessness. Sensory signals arise in the body and are transmitted to the brain.
Simultaneously, the brain generates predictions about the sensations the body should be feeling. When comparison between
predictions and sensory information shows a mismatch, prediction error is generated. This error is transmitted back through the
system, in a feedback loop, and prediction error is reduced by updating the brain’s predictions or via action generation that
alters incoming sensory information. Here we show a potential brain network structure that could carry out this process based
on the network outlined by Stephan and colleagues [12]. The key brain areas include, but are not restricted to, the anterior
insula, posterior insula, mid insula; higher brain structures including the anterior cingulate cortex and the orbitofrontal cortex;
and brain stem nuclei and midbrain structures, such as the periaqueductal gray (PAG).
Respiratory problems
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mortality (depression is associated with almost
doubled mortality over 1 year [30]) [52,53], a 10%
increase in hospitalizations and diminished social
and physical functioning (anxiety and depression
are associated with a 13.7 point difference on the
impact scale of the St George’s Respiratory Ques-
tionnaire, on which 4 points is the minimally clini-
cally important difference [54]) [23]. Furthermore,
neuroimaging studies of breathlessness perception
have identified activity in brain areas regularly
associated with emotion and affective processing
including the anterior cingulate cortex, insula and
amygdala, as well as sensory processing areas
[15,16,37,55–59]. In healthy participants, anxiety
sensitivity (defined as anxiety towards bodily sensa-
tions) appears to be related to individual variability
in breathlessness perceptions, and also to brain
activity in the precuneus during both the anticipa-
tion and perception of breathlessness, the anterior
insula during mild breathlessness and parietal sen-
sorimotor areas during strong breathlessness [60].
Furthermore, induced negative affect during resis-
tive loaded breathing gives rise to higher unpleas-
antness of perceived breathlessness relative to
induced positive affect, and is associated with activ-
ity in the right anterior insula and the right amyg-
dala [61]. Playing a role in both the anticipation and
experience of breathlessness, affect, therefore, influ-
ences activity across a broad network of brain areas
and has significant clinical implications.
Previous research has reported reduced breath-
lessness and negative emotionality following pul-
monary rehabilitation [62], and there is evidence
to suggest that breathlessness dimensions such as
mastery are also improved [7]. Although changes in
breathlessness-related anxiety have been associated
with changes in activity in the superior parietal lobe,
primary motor cortex, premotor cortex, posterior
cingulate cortex and angular gyrus [38], it is not yet
known how the dynamics of the underlying brain
network associated with breathlessness are altered.
Hence, we now look to predictive processingmodels
to help us better understand the possible underlying
mechanisms.
POTENTIAL MECHANISMS OF
BREATHLESSNESS PERCEPTION
The previous sections have described current knowl-
edge of how expectation and affect are associated
with breathlessness, and the regions of the brain
that correlate with these observations. This section
builds upon these findings and introduces the new
ideas of predictive processing to highlight potential
underlying mechanisms of breathlessness percep-
tion. The twomain areas of discussion are as follows:
(1) Dampened sensory sensitivity. Different people
have different thresholds at which they notice a
change in their breathing. We will explain why
reduced sensitivity to respiratory stimuli may
alter perceptions of breathlessness in multiple
ways.
(2) Precision and prediction. We will explain fac-
tors underlying how and why the brain may
assign differing weights to predictions and
incoming sensory signals when generating
breathlessness perceptions. The key concepts
here are:
(a) Balance between predictions and incoming
signals
(b) Increased sensitivity to contextual cues (e.g.
a flight of stairs or flowers)
(c) Resilience of learned expectations to change
in the face of contradictory evidence
Dampened sensory sensitivity
Although dampened sensory sensitivity may typi-
cally lead to reduced perceptions of bodily sensa-
tions, perceptual accuracy may also be affected. For
example, despite anxiety often being associated
with greater vigilance towards threats and bodily
sensations, it has been noted that anxiety may
actually be related to dampened sensitivity to resis-
tive respiratory stimuli [63]. Dampened sensitivity
has also been observed in people with asthma [64].
This reduced sensitivity to respiratory events
requires a greater change in stimulus to reach inter-
oceptive thresholds, which can lead to greater
reliance on expectations to help form perceptions.
If paired with heightened vigilance, the result may
exacerbate the dissociation between objective phys-
iology and symptoms.
Precision and prediction
Within a Bayesian predictive model of the brain,
when sensory signals and predictions interact, it is
the confidence or ‘precision’ values assigned to these
inputs that play a key role in how the perception is
generated [65]. The greater theprecision assigned to a
prediction or sensory input, the greater the reliance
placed on that signal and the greater influence it has
on the final perception of breathlessness. Precise
predictions and imprecise sensory signals can cause
perceptions to differ from the actual stimuli in the
world. A simple example of this is the placebo effect,
where expectation is directlymodulated by an other-
wise inert treatment [66
&&
–68
&&
].
The accuracy by which an individual can con-
sciously monitor their own internal bodily signals
Breathlessness and the brain Marlow et al.
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(interoceptive ability) is a result of both the noise
associated with incoming sensory information and
the precision of concurrent predictions. This ability
varies across individuals dependent on previous
experiences [69,70]. We will now outline some of
the potential avenues by which interoceptive abili-
ties may be altered.
The balance between predictions and
incoming signals
Within the Bayesian model, ambiguous stimuli
produce imprecise incoming sensory signals, and
thus perception is more dependent on the brain’s
predictions. An example taken from the visual sys-
tem is shown in Fig. 3. Furthermore, increased
symptom reporting in individuals with high nega-
tive emotionality [71,72] is particularly apparent
whenphysical changes, such as airway constriction,
are ambiguous or of low intensity [73]. Although
negative emotionality appears to firstly bias
predictions towards the presence of breathlessness,
this influence would be amplified when combined
with imprecise interoceptive sensory signals occur-
ring at lower stimulus intensities. For example,
when anxious, a vague, low-level respiratory
sensation that may normally go unnoticed or be
dismissed can be amplified, giving rise to the per-
ception of breathlessness. When predictions bias
perceptions away from true sensory signals, the
sensory signals must be more extreme to pull per-
ceptions back towards true sensation. Improving
both bias and the precision of sensory signals
would, therefore, increase the influence of sensa-
tion on perception, and reduce the impact of
inaccurate predictions.
Increased sensitivity to contextual cues
High symptom perceivers also appear to be more
susceptible to contextual cues, such as the explicit
suggestion of the presence of bronchoconstrictors or
FIGURE 3. Influence of predictions on ambiguous stimuli. When a stimulus in the world is ambiguous, such as the classic
rabbit-duck illusion, the brain’s predictions have a significant influence on the final perception. When primed with the concept
of a ‘rabbit’, the final perception is more likely to be that of a rabbit and vice versa for predictions of ‘duck’. In the context, of
breathlessness, the sensations in the body, from those associated with low oxygen saturation to chest tightness and shortness
of breath, can be ambiguous or of low intensity. When these sensations are ambiguous, the final breathlessness perception
is far more dependent on brain’s predictions. ‘Duck-rabbit illusion’ source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Kaninchen_und_Ente.svg; https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/fb97/0147/image.
Respiratory problems
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bronchodilators in the environment, demonstrating
a reduced reliance on incoming sensory information
[74].Negative affect appears tomagnify the influence
of contextual cues on perception, such as when pla-
cebo inhalers improve breathlessness in asthma, and
in particular in individuals susceptible to negative
emotions [75]. Furthermore, negative contextual
cues, such as foul smelling odours and explicit sug-
gestion of unpleasant feelings, have more influence
on breathlessness in susceptible individuals relative
to positive cues [72,76]. It is possible that contextual
cues may work to increase the precision of predic-
tions in high symptom perceivers, and thus reduce
the relative influence of sensory signals.
Although utilizing and learning environmental
cues that accurately predict an outcome can be
advantageous for maintaining our health, for inac-
curate or false associations this aberrant learning is
deleterious. In the context of breathlessness, reduc-
ing sensitivity to contextual cues (such as odours),
explicit suggestion and stimuli relating to broncho-
constriction (such as flower pollen) could reduce the
precision of the brain’s predictions, and thus boost
the relative influence of sensory signals on percep-
tions. This could allow a realignment of the sensory
signal and breathlessness.
Resilience of learned expectations
Several mechanisms may make perceptual expecta-
tions about breathlessness resilient to change.
Active modulation (via changes in behaviour) of
the interoceptive signalmaymean individuals expe-
rience what they expect to experience [14
&&
] (the
basis of commonly observed placebo effects). Addi-
tionally, biases in learning could influence predic-
tion updating, meaning that incorrect predictions
continue to have an influence despite their inaccu-
racy. Demonstrated in the pain literature, people
tend to only accumulate and value the information
that confirms their beliefs [14
&&
]. For example, if an
individual expects to be breathless when they have
forgotten their inhaler, the importance assigned to
occasions of a forgotten inhaler where breathless-
ness ensued is likely to be greater than for equivalent
occasions when the individual did not become
breathless. This means that the expectation of
breathlessness when without one’s inhaler can per-
sist even if the occasions on which breathlessness
actually occurs are rare. Furthermore, learned expec-
tations, based upon recalled breathlessness, can
be biased by the difference between recalled and
experienced breathlessness [77]. Such combined
mechanisms allow for the persistence of inaccurate,
although ‘precise’, predictions about breathing
despite contrarian evidence.
In summary, within a Bayesian model of breath-
lessness, it is thought to be the balance between
sensory signals and predictions that determines
perception. Affect and expectations may influence
this balance, and can drive perceptions to be based
too heavily on predictions because of dampened
sensory sensitivity and/or overly precise predictions.
Increased sensitivity to contextual cues and the
resilience of learned expectations can then easily
lead to inaccurate, yet persistent predictions that
drive perceptions of breathlessness away from objec-
tive measures of disease.
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
Considering breathlessness perception in terms of
Bayesian theories of sensory processing, as exam-
pled above, offers an informative new perspective
[23,78,79]. Within the breathlessness literature, the
previous focus on localized brain activity can nowbe
updated to incorporate the influence of broad,
dynamic brain networks.
Computational models offer one way to better
understand the communications within these net-
works. This approach allows us to make inferences
about the underlying mechanisms of breathlessness
perception, which cannot be observed directly. A
computational model mathematically formalizes
the relationship between brain activity and other
measures of interest (such as affect and expecta-
tions). A model’s predictions should be testable
via comparison with real data. The closer the model
fits the real data, the more confident we can be that
themodelmay be capturing some important aspects
of the data. We can then test whether the model
is capturing some important aspects of the data,
and therefore potentially behaviour [80
&
]. Existing
neuroimaging work typically describes correlations
between brain and behaviour, whereas computa-
tional modelling moves beyond correlations and
allows us to generate and test hypotheses regarding
the possible underlying mechanisms of breathless-
ness originating in the brain. For example, compu-
tational modelling could help elucidate how
different columns of the periaqueductal gray com-
municate with the insula and sensory cortices to
generate, update and/or compare predictions relat-
ing to breathlessness. This may allow us to demark
the influences of predictions versus sensory intero-
ceptive signals in the brain. Using these models to
identify brain-based markers of inaccurate percep-
tions should then help us to understand reinforce-
ment of maladaptive predictions and mechanisms
of action for affect and emotion. Importantly,
utilizing computational models could inform how
expectations and affect influence breathlessness
Breathlessness and the brain Marlow et al.
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perception, leading us toward implementations for
positive change for each individual.
HELPING PATIENTS
Despite clinical observations, treatment of comor-
bid mood disorders in clinically breathless groups
via anxiolytics or antidepressants does not produce
the expected improvements in breathlessness
[81,82
&&
]. These findings are not entirely surprising,
as within the predictive processing framework,
improving breathlessness is not simply about
improving mood but also realigning the whole
system of expectations, predictions and sensory
processing.
Identifying specific neurocognitive markers
related to over-weighted predictions, dampened
sensory sensitivity and/or heightened effects of con-
textual cues should aid patient group stratification
and tailored treatment plan development. By
attempting to formally model breathlessness per-
ception in the brain, we may expose neural targets
for both pharmacological and nonpharmacological
interventions, such as neurofeedback strategies,
which focus on training specific brain pathways.
Furthermore, predictive models could give rise to
more accurate bedside measures that are developed
from neural mechanisms, as well as predict success-
ful drug and behavioural therapy combinations to
be used in personalized treatment plans.
CONCLUSION
Utilizing predictive models of symptom generation
opens avenues of opportunity to progress our under-
standing of breathlessness. These advances could
change the way that we measure and treat breath-
lessness using brain-based markers and a personal-
ized approach. Current work outlining the brain
networks of breathlessness perception, alongside
modern neuroscientific thinking, provides a spring-
board for understanding causal mechanisms that
have the potential to change the way we treat
breathlessness.
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